






Political decision makers hope that international
comparisons of institutions will give them insights
that will help to improve decision making in their
own country.They wish to know what institutional
arrangements have been chosen by other countries
and whether the arrangements chosen have yield-
ed desirable results. The questions associated with
institutional learning are discussed in the next
three sections.
In addition to institutional learning, political deci-
sion-makers must decide on which regulations they
wish to transfer to their own countries.These deci-
sions will be guided by the goals of the decision-
makers, by political competition and by the nature
and intensity of the competition between systems
that the country is exposed to.The transfer of insti-
tutions from other countries can be hindered by a
country’s insufficient ability to make institutional
adjustments and by powerful interest groups. Both
hindrances are not unalterable. Questions in con-
nection with the transfer of institutions will be
treated in the second part of this article.
International comparison of institutions: A mod-
ern basis for political decisions
The way an economy works is determined deci-
sively by its institutions.Institutions regulate social
life.They impose limits to individual comportment
and steer it into certain channels. They contribute
to the stabilisation of expectations. Regulations
determine the economic processes, on the other
hand they themselves are expressions of basic eco-
nomic and social developments. Far-reaching insti-
tutional reforms cannot be carried out without
social consensus. An example is the Wassenaar
Agreement of 1983 that led to employment pro-
moting wage and labour market policies in the
Netherlands. Included among institutions are the
market, the laws of the state, government regula-
tions, and court decisions, agreements between
interest groups, as well as norms, customs, and
value judgements shared by the members of soci-
ety (Regini 2000, p. 22). The following remarks
focus on labour market regulations emanating
from the state (e.g.legal dispositions regulating the
termination of employment) and on agreements
between interest groups (e.g. wage agreements
between employers and trade unions).
Laying down institutional arrangements has always
been a fundamental responsibility of the state. In
fulfilling this responsibility, governments have
always been aware of the arrangements prevailing
in other countries.Since the beginning of the 1980s,
however, so-called benchmarking has gained con-
siderably in importance. In view of the “euroscle-
rosis” that has been diagnosed, a debate has begun
on the advantages and disadvantages of Europe as
a place to live or work or conduct a business.In this
debate, great attention has been given to differ-
ences with respect to state regulation between
European states, especially as compared to the
United States (Tronti 1998).And in transformation
economies as well, governments have been eager
to adapt institutional set-ups of western countries
that seem to promise success. In carrying out
benchmarking studies, international organisations
such as the OECD, the European Commission and
the International Labour Office (ILO) have given
support to individual countries.
The increasing importance of international compar-
isons of institutions in recent years is due to a num-
ber of factors.As a result of globalisation, location-
al competition is becoming more intense. State reg-
ulations are becoming increasingly more important
as a locational factor for enterprises that operate
internationally. Governments are thus competing
against each other in an attempt to develop an insti-
tutional framework that is as attractive as possible.
The growth of international integration means that
increasingly ‘national’ economies are subject to sim-
ilar shocks.This provides a better basis for evaluat-
ing the ability of national institutional arrangements
to cope with such shocks. Institutional learning,
which is facilitated by improvements in communica-
tions,is developing into an important foundation for
political decisions (Dolowitz and Marsh 2000).
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Another reason for the increasing importance of
international comparisons of institutions is to be
seen in the on-going dissolution of the original
ideological foundations of the modern welfare
state. This means that the traditional sources of
legitimisation for the state’s economic policies are
increasingly called into question. On the other
hand,established ideological positions are less and
less a hindrance to adapting other countries’ ideas
and institutional arrangements. A pragmatic atti-
tude is becoming more and more common.
Politicians look increasingly to those states that
have the status of a role model. Wisconsin Works,
for example, has attracted much attention. Other
countries’ successful institutional arrangements
serve to legitimise institutional change in one’s
own country (Cox 1999).
International comparisons can trigger institutional
reforms in two ways. On the one hand, the obser-
vation of weaknesses vis-à-vis comparable coun-
tries and the resulting recommendations place
national decision-makers under pressure to justify
their policies. On the other hand, international
comparisons can offer solutions that can be pur-
sued in a national context when designing reforms.
For example, the active social policies in Denmark
and the privatisation of reintegration services in
Australia and in the Netherlands have influenced
the Hartz legislation in Germany.This has expand-
ed the repertoire of possible problem solutions
beyond the national horizon (Eichhorst,Thode and
Winter 2004, p. 58).
Capturing the institutional arrangements of other
countries
The first step in carrying out an international
comparison of institutions is to choose the coun-
tries with which the institutions of a particular
country are to be compared. A country’s institu-
tional networks are influenced by the political
environment (dictatorship, democracy), by the
economic system (planned, market economy), by
the stage of development in which the country
finds itself (developing, threshold, industrialised
economy), by the prevailing culture of regulation
(formal vs. informal regulation) of the country, to
name only the most important influences.
Institutional learning is, as a rule, only possible
when the countries used for comparison exhibit
similar characteristics.
In connection with the selection of comparable
countries,the question arises of whether there is an
individual country whose institutional arrange-
ment is superior to all other countries with regard
to the pursuit of economic-policy goals and to
which special attention should thus be given. This
“one-best-way”thesis has not yet been proved,and
it is challenged by the thesis of a functional equiv-
alence of institutional systems, according to which
a specific goal can be achieved just as well with dif-
ferent institutional systems. As proof of functional
equivalence, proponents give the example that
both a welfare state, such as Sweden, and a liberal
economic system, as that in the United States, can
produce very nearly full employment (Freeman
1995).Also the job-creating successes of the Dutch
Polder model can be used to support the equiva-
lence thesis.
The next question is, what institutions should be
compared.This depends, of course, on the question
under discussion and on the empirically determined
relevance for that question of the institutions under
review. In many cases, it will prove important to
ascertain the reasons and the immediate cause for
the introduction of specific institutional arrange-
ments. Only when this is known, will it be possible
to determine whether the motives for the foreign
arrangement are analogous to the problems at
home for which one seeks a solution.The degree of
congruence in the objectives pursued casts light on
the question of whether the regulatory model will
be of use in attaining a given goal.
In order to carry out a comparison between coun-
tries, it is often necessary to make the institutional
arrangements in the different countries compara-
ble. This may require converting qualitative infor-
mation into quantitative; it may require aggregat-
ing individual indicators into a comprehensive
indicator. Weighting schemes based on cluster or
on factor analysis can be helpful in this connection
(Nicoletti et al. 1999).A concrete example for this
kind of procedure is the compression of many indi-
vidual indicators into one comprehensive indicator
representing the effectiveness of the measures of
protection against dismissal in individual countries
(OECD 1999 and 2004).
Comparisons limited to a point in time are often not
sufficient to capture the differences between insti-
tutional arrangements.As a rule, such arrangements
are initially introduced or later modified in thecourse of reform processes extending over longer
periods of time.Furthermore,institutions only bring
about behavioural changes and processes of adapta-
tion affecting the real economy when they have
been applied over a certain period of time.
Therefore, it is necessary to compare institutions in
their development over time. But time series appro-
priate to this task are not always available.
One problem in carrying out international compar-
isons of institutions is that the texts of laws and
edicts do not tell us whether they are actually
applied or not. One country’s strict rules may be
paired with lax enforcement, whilst another coun-
try’s lax provisions may be applied with great
rigour.Simply comparing the text of the law would,
in such cases, give a misleading picture. The appli-
cation of sanctions for refusal of work by unem-
ployed persons can serve as an example. Of the 12
OECD countries which use sanctions, Switzerland,
Finland and Norway apply them relatively strictly;
Japan,New Zealand,Belgium and Germany,on the
other hand, apply them hardly at all (OECD 2000,
p. 136). This example shows that evaluating the
institutional arrangement without knowledge of its
application is not satisfactory. But the information
required for a well-founded evaluation is often not
available either.
International comparisons of institutions should not
be limited to laws and administrative orders. The
establishment of norms as well as the interpretation
of legal or administrative provisions by the courts
are significant in many cases (Ichino et al. 2001).At
the same time, attention must be paid to informal
norms and customs, which are particularly impor-
tant in lightly regulated countries. In the USA, for
example, a high degree of external labour market
flexibility resulting from scant protection against
dismissal stands in contrast to a low degree of flexi-
bility within the enterprise (Regini 2000, p. 23).
Evaluation of institutional arrangements
The international comparison of institutions
should not stop at the mere collection of other
countries’ institutional arrangements, but should
proceed to the identification of those arrange-
ments that have brought about desirable results.
Those institutions that can contribute to the solu-
tion of specific problems in the researcher’s own
country have a claim to his special interest. The
identification of appropriate institutional arrange-
ments requires, as a prior condition, their evalua-
tion.This procedure must be carried out in several
steps: the objectives must be defined as a basis for
measuring the effectiveness of the institutions; the
intensity of compliance must be examined; the
effectiveness of the arrangement must be estimat-
ed and a comprehensive cost-benefit analysis must
be carried out (Schmid et al. 1996, p. 5).
Labour market institutions are created in order to
attain certain results by means of modifications in
the behaviour or in the expectations of the partici-
pants in the labour market. Correspondingly, the
immediate objective can be to influence a certain
behavioural or expectational aspect, e.g. the search
activity of unemployed persons, the avoidance of
free rider activities, or other behaviour (Teulings
and Hartog 1998, p. 110). On the other hand, the
goal pursued can refer to certain labour market
results,such as the position of the Beveridge curve,
the equilibrium volume of unemployment, or real
wage developments. From the objectives, perfor-
mance indicators can be derived which can serve as
a basis for assessing the institutional arrangements.
The second step in evaluation refers to the imple-
mentation of the institutional arrangement.
Arrangements that only exist on paper have scant
effect. In order for them to have effect, they must
be applied to the persons specified and the applica-
tion must be long-term. In some cases, compliance
must be enforced by means of sanctions.
Implementation includes not only the concrete
application but also its harmonisation with comple-
mentary institutions and with discretionary eco-
nomic policy measures. The behaviour of relevant
actors must also be coordinated.As has been men-
tioned,the implementation of institutional arrange-
ments is seldom documented.This is another obsta-
cle to international comparisons of institutions.
The estimation of the effectiveness of institutional
arrangements is affected by theoretical considera-
tions. For quite a long time the neoclassical theory
of the labour market was dominant, and since it
offered no room for the role of institutions,little or
no attention was paid to their role in the labour
market. In the last 15 to 20 years, however, such
institutions have become increasingly an object of
theoretical and empirical interest.Although a self-
contained theoretical construction is still not avail-
able, there are a number of individual models that
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take institutional aspects into account (Blau and
Kahn 1999; Nickell and Layard 1999). The effects
emanating from labour market institutions are
complex.One reason for this is that there are influ-
ences coming from other determinants of econom-
ic activity such as the regulation of markets for
goods, the financial incentives set by the state, the
composition of the participants in the labour mar-
ket and their behavioural patterns. Then too, it
must be borne in mind that the effects observed
are quite possibly not pure effects, but only take
place in connection with certain kinds of shocks
(Blanchard and Wolfers 2000).
Two different methods may be used to determine
the effectiveness of labour market institutions
(Ochel 2004):
•A ggregate analyses of effectiveness measure
the influence of labour market institutions on
certain macroeconomic indicators that are
defined as the performance criteria. Examples
could be employment rates, unemployment
rates, exits from unemployment or the level of
wages.Such analyses of effectiveness are carried
out at the regional or national level or as com-
parisons between pairs of countries. In addition,
multiple comparisons have gained in impor-
tance. Here, the effects of one or more institu-
tional arrangements in different countries are
analysed. Such studies may be based on cross
section analysis, or the cross sectional data are
combined with time series. An advantage of
aggregate analyses is that they take into account
both direct and indirect effects. A disadvantage
is that although effective institutions can be
identified, very little light is shed on the details
of the most desirable institutional arrangement.
•T he last-mentioned disadvantage is less likely to
attend microeconomic evaluation studies. Here
the researcher attempts to estimate the effect of
institutional arrangements on the market partic-
ipant directly affected by means of individual
data.The actual situation is compared to a coun-
terfactual situation in which it is supposed that
he or she were not affected. Of course, the same
person cannot be at once affected and not
affected. It is therefore necessary to form a con-
trol group, which ideally should differ from the
group of persons affected only in one respect:
the institutional arrangement under review does
not affect them (Schmidt et al. 2001, p. 28).
Social experiments of this kind have been car-
ried out above all in North America but scarce-
ly in Europe. Microeconomic evaluation can
also be based on data not obtained from exper-
iments.This approach seeks to replace the miss-
ing control group with econometric and statisti-
cal procedures (Heckmann et al. 1999). Micro-
economic evaluations capture the direct but not
the indirect effects. The indirect effects arise as
a result of substitution and displacement effects
as well as macroeconomic circular flow effects.
Analyses of effectiveness only provide information
about the effects of institutional arrangements.The
effects obtained must, however, be set in relation
to the cost they entail. If all direct and indirect
effects and costs have been taken into account,
then in effect a comprehensive cost-benefit analy-
sis has been carried out that would form a basis for
economic policy decisions.
International institutional transfer when there is
competition between systems
In addition to institutional learning governments
have to decide on which regulations they want to
transfer to their own country. These decisions will
be guided among other things by the autonomy of
decision-makers or in other words by the nature
and intensity of systems competition that a country
is exposed to.What is more,a government pursuing
its own interests will decide in a different way than
a benevolent government.
Although the government of an autonomous coun-
try stands in political competition, it is not subject
to the conditions of systems competition. Such a
government is thus not obliged to consider the
effects of its policies on the locational decisions of
the mobile factors of production (real capital and
workers), effects which systems competition may
induce.Instead,it is only obligated to its own inter-
ests or to those of its citizens. It will adopt regula-
tions from other countries depending on these
obligations.
Unlike the situation in a largely closed economy,
governments in open economies must take into
consideration in making their decisions that some
of their economic agents have the option of cross-
border solutions. With their decisions on produc-
tion locations,internationally mobile factors of pro-
duction can express their estimation of the attrac-tiveness of national investment locations. In some
cases, the mere announcement of shifts in location
sites or only the reference to more favourable insti-
tutional systems in other countries suffice to influ-
ence their own governments.A government’s scope
of action in political competition is thus limited.
For systems competition to become an effective
factor, some conditions must be met:
•F irstly, the factors of production must be
mobile. Globalisation has made this more possi-
ble than ever before for investment capital and
for skilled labour. At the same time, mobility is
still limited by transaction costs, mobility costs
and regulations.
• Furthermore, international differences in insti-
tutional regulations must be able to lead to
shifts in production locations.This can but need
not be the case. If, for example, the population
of a country tends to consist of risk-averse peo-
ple, they will not leave the “protective network”
of their own country and go to a country whose
people are less risk-averse and whose regula-
tions are less all-encompassing.Also the utilisa-
tion of specialisation advantages could speak
against the idea that an increase in internation-
al regulation differences induces enterprises to
shift their locations. According to the theory of
comparative institutional advantages, the spe-
cialisation of countries in specific products
reflects their specialisation in particular institu-
tional arrangements. The United States, for
example,with its deregulated labour market and
dynamic venture capital market, would provide
advantages to enterprises that concentrate on
“radical innovations” (development of com-
pletely new products, employment of new pro-
duction methods). In Germany, on the other
hand, a system of industrial law and corporate
governance has been formed that favours incre-
mental innovations: continuous, small improve-
ments in products and processes (Hall and
Soskice 2001). Enterprises that exploit the asso-
ciated site advantages will not be motivated to
change locations because of differences in insti-
tutional arrangements.
• For systems competition to take effect, a govern-
ment must also be able to identify the institu-
tional arrangements in its own country that have
been major factors in shifts of location.This may
be difficult because the migration of mobile fac-
tors is not selective, as a rule, with regard to indi-
vidual institutional regulations (for example,
stricter protection against dismissal in an inter-
national comparison) but with regard to a whole
package of institutional regulations,tax and busi-
ness laws as well as other determinants.
•F inally for systems competition to take effect the
political actors who are exposed to diverse influ-
ences in the collective process of opinion forma-
tion must be aware of the needs of mobile entre-
preneurs and workers. Their interests and the
interests of the indirectly affected immobile
agents of production must be organised in order
that the necessity for reform in certain regulatory
areas be recognized. Interests can be most effec-
tively pursued when there is the possibility credi-
bly to threaten the government with sanctions in
a political context (Streit and Kiwit 1999).
As has been shown, competition between systems
forces politicians to take into account the reactions
of the mobile factors of production. This competi-
tion can bring about different results.It can be func-
tional and thus lead to an improvement in the insti-
tutional framework. Institutions can be suboptimal
because the state has pursued the interest of politi-
cal actors or of specific pressure groups and has dis-
regarded the preferences of the citizens (Brennan
and Buchanan 1980). In this case, systems competi-
tion has a controlling influence on the political
actors. For example, excessively strict laws against
wrongful dismissal,that a government introduced in
the interests of unions,can be corrected by the loca-
tional moves of the enterprises that need reversibil-
ity with respect to their personell decisions. But in
the case of a “benevolent” state as well, the institu-
tional framework can be improved by systems com-
petition. Systems competition leads to a discovery
process in which information is supplied on the
design of institutions in other countries and their
problem-solving capacity, thus contributing to the
gradual correction of institutional deficits.
Systems competition can also, however, be a dis-
turbing factor that hinders the state in its task of
correcting market failures in the interest of its citi-
zens. In this case, systems competition is dysfunc-
tional, that is, it impairs in fact desirable regula-
tions. This can be exemplified by looking at social
welfare systems.In an open economy with the right
to change the country of residence, people repre-
senting a “good risk” are inclined to leave the wel-
fare state, whilst those representing a “bad-risk”
are attracted to such a state.Factor migrations lead
CESifo DICE Report 4/2004 48
Research ReportsCESifo DICE Report 4/2004 49
Research Reports
to financial burdens for the welfare state. In order
to reduce factor migrations, the state favours the
net payers and disadvantages the net receivers by
cutting their benefits. Here preference is given to
regulations that have proved to be successful in
countries with similar problems. The result is an
erosion of the social welfare systems. A Pareto-
optimal redistribution policy from a national
standpoint, as represented by the establishment of
a social welfare system,can suffer as a result unless
countermeasures are undertaken (Sinn 2003).
Path dependency as a hindrance for institutional
transfer
The competition between systems, which is part of
the globalisation process, has increased the pressure
to reform the institutional arrangements whilst at the
same time taking into account the reactions of
mobile factors of production. Here it has proved to
be useful to consider the experiences gained in other
countries. In view of this new challenge, the question
arises as to what extent national systems of institu-
tions are capable of being modified? Is it only possi-
ble to transfer foreign institutional arrangements
when they are compatible with existing values and
with the existing network of institutions in the target
country? Under what conditions will the interaction
between the foreign institutions and the traditional
set of rules be seriously disturbed (problem of insti-
tutional coherence)? To what extent will the institu-
tional transfer make excessive demands on the pro-
cedural competence of the recipient country?
In responding to these questions the thesis of the
path dependency of institutional development has
gained recognition. The thesis is that institutional
change at home is only influenced to a slight
degree, if at all, by the perception of the evolution
of foreign institutions; all attempts to learn from
foreign countries, and especially all attempts to
implement what has been learned, can only be suc-
cessful if carried out in the context of existing insti-
tutions (Scherrer 2001, p. 1). Disturbances of insti-
tutional compatibility give rise to considerable
costs, so that path dependency is associated with
considerable institutional inflexibility.
On what notion of path dependency are these
ideas based? According to Ackermann (2001, p.
55), path dependency is present if the process of
institutional development depends on the preced-
ing path of development. A state of institutional
development that has been attained tends to be
self reinforcing and hence a considerable measure
of institutional inflexibility is the result (Arthur
1994). It is difficult to adapt institutional arrange-
ments to changed conditions.Therefore,there is lit-
tle scope for transferring successful arrangements
from foreign countries.
The inflexibility of paths of institutional develop-
ment is due to positive feedbacks. Following David
(1994), Ackermann (2001, chapter 3) distinguishes
between three causes of positive feedbacks in insti-
tutions. They refer to the level of actions of inter-
acting individuals, to the level of rules that struc-
ture these interactions, and to the interrelationship
between the levels of actions and rules. On the
action level,coordination effects arise as a result of
the advantages offered by standardised patterns of
behaviour. These can lead to stable rules. At the
level of rules, complementary effects will arise if
the interdependent relationships between institu-
tions are of a complementary nature, i.e. if follow-
ing a particular rule becomes more attractive as a
result of the interdependence with other rules.
Positive feedback as a result of interactions be-
tween the levels of societal rules and the level of
individual behaviour, finally, result in processes of
social communication in a society that lead to the
convergence in its members’ mental structures.
In the concept of path dependency, the feedback
effects are responsible for the fact that the path of
institutional development imposes narrow limits
on the scope for institutional modifications. For
this reason suboptimal institutions are retained.
The legacy of existing institutions also sets very
narrow limits to the possibilities of institutional
transfer across international boundaries. The path
of institutional development is only departed from
when the actors consider the loss of efficiency to be
greater than the costs associated with the creation
of new and efficient institutions (North 1992).
A number of objections to the thesis of path depen-
dence and institutional inflexibility may be formu-
lated. It does not seem very plausible to see in the
past development of institutions only a limiting
force but not at the same time a source of experi-
ence that can be useful in carrying out the reform of
institutions. At the same time, it is not at all clear
that a path consists only of self-reinforcing se-
quences and that counter-reactions are inconceiv-able. A further central deficiency of the notion of
path dependency is that it is difficult to opera-
tionalise.What is the relevant period of time for the
path? Which institutions are decisive for the path?
Which events that may have influenced the path
should be taken into consideration (Scherrer 2001)?
Apart from the objections to the “regularity” of
institutional development, the question arises
whether the necessary institutional compatibility
does not also depend on the nature and extent of
the institutional arrangements that are to be trans-
ferred. In this connection a differentiation must be
made between global problem definitions and
solution strategies, on the one hand, and particular
programmes and measures, on the other (Schmid
1999; Schludi 2003). Global solution strategies
(active instead of passive social policies) that are
first devised in the national context as concrete
reforms can be transmitted between welfare states
with similar institutional structures relatively easi-
ly (Denmark, Sweden). On the other hand, the
model of the liberal labour market of the United
States cannot be easily transferred to a corporatis-
tic country such as Germany with its collective bar-
gaining arrangements. In the case of particular
institutional regulations, the transfer can be much
easier. They can, without a great deal of interface
problems, be adapted to the national institutional
structure. The adaptation requirement in the
national context is relatively small, also when com-
plementarity with other institutional regulations
must be taken into consideration (Orzag and
Snower 1999).
Despite these points of criticism, the empirical evi-
dence is not entirely hostile to the idea of path
dependency. The inertial energy with which many
west European countries cling to their labour mar-
ket institutions seems to be related to the inflexi-
bility predicted by the thesis of path dependence.
However, with respect to labour market institu-
tions in highly developed economies it is not possi-
ble to speak of complete inflexibility.Great Britain
and New Zealand are not the only countries to
have successfully carried out reforms of their
labour market institutions; other countries such as
the Netherlands, Denmark and currently Germany
have also made such reforms. What is more, the
process of institutional learning has gained in
importance in recent decades. And then the ques-
tion arises of whether the inertia observed in many
countries is really due to path dependence or
whether other factors such as the resistance of
powerful interest groups are responsible.
The political economy of institutional transfer
The theory of path dependency refers to sponta-
neous development processes that are not the
result of contests of power. If such processes only
offer a partial explanation for the inflexibility of
institutions and thus for the limits to institutional
transfer, then the question arises whether the
power of the state and the influence exerted by
interest groups are not the principal factors hin-
dering the international transfer of institutions?
Relationships of power can play a role in connec-
tion with perceiving and selecting advantageous
institutional arrangements, in persuading socially
relevant groups at home that particular arrange-
ments are advantageous, and in introducing and
applying such arrangements.
According to Scherrer (2001), even the perception
of the advantageousness of institutions is tied to
interests. In the national discourse on institutional
reform, only those institutions or arrangements
that are deemed compatible with the interests of
the elites and the influential interest groups are
admitted to the debate.The ability of central actors
in society to convince others of the advantages of
foreign arrangements depends among other things
on whether they succeed in presenting the eco-
nomic problems under discussion as being so
threatening that they can only be dealt with suc-
cessfully by adapting foreign institutions,which are
presented as having coped successfully with the
problem. This ability will be all the greater, the
more influence these central actors have in the
process of opinion formation.
If power relationships and competing interests
play an important role in determining the content
of the national discourse on foreign institutional
models, they play an even more decisive role in the
decisions concerning the introduction and the
implementation of institutional arrangements.
Political decision-making processes are deter-
mined by the monopoly power of the state to fix
the design and sequence of the reform steps as well
as by the necessity of attaining voter approval on
the reforms. If the potential results of the institu-
tional reforms are very insecure, a revision of the
reforms is only possible at high costs, and if many
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voters feel they are the losers of the reforms, their
resistance can be expected (Roland 2002). If the
losers constitute powerful interest groups, then the
reforms will be prevented.
Resistance to the adaptation of foreign labour
market regulations can have different causes:
•T he number of losers is larger than the number
of winners. Thus, for example, the liberalisation
of the protection against wrongful dismissal will
mean that for many insiders the risk of losing
their jobs increases; but the chance of finding
employment will only increase for a relatively
small number of unemployed persons.
•T he number of losers resulting from a reform of
the labour market may be small, but the much
larger number of winners is scattered among
many heterogeneous groups that, aside from
labour market issues, have different interests, so
that they are unable or unwilling to agree on a
common strategy to push through reform. In
such a case the losers may be successful in their
resistance.
•T here is uncertainty about the effects of the
reform. A large number of those who will be
affected are risk adverse and unable to form an
opinion of whether they will in the end be
among the losers. They therefore argue in
favour of retaining the status quo.
• To  the extent that the reform brings about
improvements in efficiency, compensatory pay-
ments may make winners out of potential losers.
But the potential losers are afraid that the com-
pensation will not be high enough, or will be
reduced in future, and therefore withhold their
approval (Alogoskoufis et al. 1995, chap. 6;
Dewatripont and Roland 1995; Saint-Paul 2000).
Policy learning – a way to remove the transfer
barriers? 
The transfer of institutional regulations from other
countries can be hindered by an inadequate insti-
tutional adaptability and by the domestic political
balance of power.Both hindrances are not unalter-
able, however. Positive feedback effects that are
responsible for the inflexibility of paths of institu-
tional development can be counteracted by alter-
ing standardized behaviour (and thus stable rules)
through a learning process of the relevant actors.
In the same way resistance to institutional reforms
from pressure groups can be reduced when
“knowledge coalitions” consisting of experts con-
vincingly demonstrate the advantages of adopting
regulations from other countries.
The prerequisite for removing transfer barriers is
the ability of actors to learn,which is also known as
policy learning. Policy learning refers to learning
processes that lead to a changed assessment of spe-
cific institutional regulations and that increase the
legitimacy of adopting institutions from other
countries. Learning from other countries often
occurs as a result of external shocks and can result
in subsequent modifications in the domestic politi-
cal arrangement (Jenkins-Smith and Sabatier 1993;
Schmid 2003).
There have been attempts in many countries to
benefit in political decision-making from the expe-
riences of other countries with different institu-
tional regulations. For example, in Germany the
benchmarking group in the Alliance for Jobs and
the Hartz Commission have introduced the prob-
lem-solving approaches of other countries into in
the political debate in Germany.This was only par-
tially successful, however, although the so-called
“window of political opportunity” was open. The
reasons for this partial success are the weak influ-
ence that academics have on politicians, the politi-
cal balance of power and the veto positions of pow-
erful pressure groups.
Summary
The international comparison of institutions has
become more important. It is an instrument with
which the political decision makers in a country
seek to learn from other countries and to improve
the quality of subsequent decisions. The learning
process is not confined simply to finding out what
the institutional arrangements of foreign countries
are, but also examines the effectiveness of these
arrangements. Analyses of aggregate effects of
institutional arrangements measure the influence
of institutions on indicators that are defined
macroeconomically. They inform us as to which
arrangements have been internationally successful
at a global level. Microeconomic evaluations, on
the other hand, focus on individual regulatory
efforts and estimate their effects on those directly
affected.By comparative analysis of microeconom-
ic evaluations, insights into the best design for in-dividual regulations (best practices) may be
obtained.
The transfer of institutions from other countries is
determined by the goals of the government, by
political competition and to an increasing extent by
systems competition. The latter forces governments
to take into account the effects of their decisions on
the locational choices of mobile factors of produc-
tion. Systems competition can influence institution-
al transfer in different ways. Depending on the con-
ditions, it can lead to an improvement, but also to a
worsening, of domestic institutional regulations.
Different factors limit the scope for adapting insti-
tutional arrangements that seem to promise suc-
cess. The inflexibility of one’s own institutional
arrangements and values arising from path depen-
dency makes the adaptation of foreign institution-
al arrangements more difficult. In addition, restric-
tions on political decision-making processes as well
as powerful interest groups at home may be
opposed to the transfer of institutions, or may
influence the content of such a transfer. Policy
learning may, however, reduce the barriers for an
international transfer of institutions.The combined
effects of all of these factors, which are different
from one country to another, lead to the multiplic-
ity of institutional systems that characterises
today’s international scene (Freeman 2000).
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